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THE FAIR TRADE ACT
WALLACE H. MARTINt
HE fight over the constitutionality of New York's Fair Trade Act
has begun. Justice Brennan of the Kings County Supreme Court up-
holds the constitutionality of the Act:'
"In enacting the statute, . .. the Legislature acted within its constitutional
powers. It recognized an existing condition as evil and did not act arbitrarily
or unreasonably when it provided a means of making effective a remedy for
that condition."
Justice Close of Westchester County Supreme Court, holds the Act
unconstitutional:2
"Unless the courts are prepared to hold that by placing his brand upon a
commodity, the producer retains a property right in that commodity until it
reaches the hands of the consumer, so that he may fix its price at every state
of distribution, this statute must fall. . . . The use of so-called 'loss-leaders'
is to attract customers and is no more destructive of competitors than are other
forms of advertising that attract public attention ...
"Many writers on economic questions have long urged that legislative relief
be granted against so-called price cutting, maintaining that it is an economic
evil that should be eradicated. That may be so but my present opinion is
that our fundamental law must be changed before such an act 'as this can be
upheld."
Justice Rosenman of the New York County Supreme Court finds the
Act unconstitutional:'
"An analysis of this statute discloses several startling features so arbitrary
and discriminatory in effect that the statute cannot be sustained under this
principle, in so far as it applies to retailers who have not signed price main-
tenance agreements."
Which viewpoint is correct will, no doubt, be determined in the near
future by an appellate court. In the meantime, a discussion of the Act
and its history seems warranted.
The stated purpose of the Act is laudable. It is an act "to protect
trade-mark owners, distributors and the public against injurious and
uneconomic practices in the distribution of articles of standard quality
under a distinguished trade-mark brand or name."4  There is no dis-
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Cooper & Cooper v. Angert, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 2, 1935, at 1655 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.).
2. Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., N. Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 18, 1935.
3. Coty, Inc. v. Ilearn Dep't Stores, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 26, 1935, at 2077 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct.).
4. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 967. Approved May 17, 1935.
Section 1. Subdivision 1. No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity
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pute that predatory price cutting and other similar "uneconomic prac-
tices" are injurious. They despoil the good will represented by trade-
marks. They deprive the honest dealer of a fair profit and thus tend
to cause economic distress. They are "bait" held out to the public to
attract trade in other merchandise, which may be sold at exorbitant
profits. Mr. Justice Holmes said in his dissenting opinion in the Dr.
Miles Medical Case,5 one of the early price fixing cases:
"I cannot believe that in the long run the public .ill profit by this court per-
mitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own
and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles which
it is assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to get."
For more than twenty years manufacturers of trade-marked products
have sought the remedy for these practices. The decision in the Miles
Medical Case came in 1911. That decision outlawed contracts between
manufacturers, wholesalers and dealers providing for minimum resale
prices. Such contracts were found violative of the Sherman Anti-Trust
which bears, or the label or content of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the
producer or owner of such commodity and which is in fair and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced by others shall be deemed in violation of
any law of the state of New York by reason of any of the following provisions which may
be contained in such contract:
(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price stipulated by
the vendor.
(b) That the vendee or producer require in delivery to whom he may resell such com-
modity to agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at the price stipulated by such vendor
or by such vendee.
2. Such provisions in any contract sal be deemed to contain or imply conditions that
such commodity may be resold without reference to such aareement in the following cases:
(a) In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing delivering any
such commodity.
(b) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and notice is given to the
public thereof.
(c) By any officer acting under the orders of any court.
§ 2. Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at
less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the provision of
section one of this act, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or
is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any
person damaged thereby.
§ 3. This act shall not apply to any contract or agreement between producers or between
wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or resale prices.
§ 4. The following terms, as used in this act, are hereby defined as follows: 'Producer"
means grower, baker, maker, manufacturer or publisher. "Commodity" means any subject
of commerce.
§ S. If any provision of this act is declared unconstitutional it is the intent of the
legislature that the remaining portions thereof shall not be affected but that such remaining
portions remain in full force and effect.
§ 6. This act shall take effect immediately.
5. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373, 412 (1911).
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Act and the common law. Persistent attempts were made to break down
the barrier against maintaining retail prices. Prior to the Miles Medical
Case, a copyright owner had attempted unsuccessfully to maintain that the
copyright statute could be made the basis for price maintenance con-
tracts.' Subsequently patentees contended that the exclusive right to
vend given by statute included the right to fix prices.7 The results were
the same. Ownership was held to carry with it the privilege of selling
at any price desired.
Contemporaneous witl these legal proceedings, efforts were made to
secure national legislation authorizing resale price contracts, but with-
out success.
In 1916, a New Jersey statute8 was enacted providing as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any merchant, firm or corporation to appropriate
for his or their own use a name, brand, trade-mark, reputation or good will
of any maker in whose product said merchant, firm or corporation deals, or to
discriminate against the same by depreciating th value of such products in
the public mind, or by misrepresentation as to value or quality or by price
inducement, or by unfair discrimination between buyers, or in any other manner
whatsoever except in cases where said goods do not carry any notice prohibiting
such practice, and excepting in case of a receiver's sale, or a sale by a concern
going out of business."
The constitutionality of this statute was upheld and an injunction
granted by the New Jersey Chancery Court."
In 1931, the California legislature passed a measure'0 providing for
resale price contracts between manufacturers and their distributors but
giving no remedy against price-cutting by distributors not under con-
tract. This law proved ineffective and, in 1933, it was amended by
the addition of a section reading as follows:
"Section 132-Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling
any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into
pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of this act, whether the person so
advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract,
is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby."
The California statute as thus amended" has become a model for state
legislation in Iowa, Maryland, Oregon, Washington, New Jersey, Penn-
6. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1908); Straus v. American Publishers
Ass'n, 231 U. S. 222 (1913).
7. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912); Bauer v. O'Donnell,
229 U. S. 1 (1913); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490 (1917).
8. N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 225-1.
9. Ingersoll v. Hahne, 88 N. J. Eq. 222, 101 At. 1030 (Ch. 1917).
10. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 278.
11. Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 260..
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sylvania, Illinois and Wisconsin, in addition to New York. Other states
have bills pending.
The New York Act permits manufacturers of trade-marked merchan-
dise to establish minimum resale prices to the consumer and to render
those who disregard such minimum prices liable to suit for damages.
Section 1 of the Act permits manufacturers to enter into contracts with
wholesale and retail distributors specifying the minimum prices below
which the goods may not be sold. It provides that the goods must be
in "free and open competition" with other products of similar kind or
character. It also provides that such contracts shall not apply where the
goods are disposed of in bouz fide clearance sales or as assets in bank-
ruptcy pursuant to court order.
Sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 1 specify those who may enter
into contracts under the Act.
Sub-section (a) reads:
"'That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price stipulated
by the vendor."
The sub-section seems to contemplate a contract between a buyer and
his vendor. Manufacturers, under this construction of sub-section (a),
may not enter into contracts with retailers if they sell to jobbers and not
direct to retailers.
Subdivision (b) reads:
"That the vendee or producer require in delivery to whom he may resell
such commodity to agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at the price
stipulated by such vendor or by such vendee."
Obviously an error occurs here. Probably the words "in delivery" were
intended to be "the person." This sub-section would seem to require
that the manufacturer contract with the person to whom he sold the goods
and that in turn his vendee enter into similar contracts and so on down
the line until the retailer is reached. A construction of these sub-sections
which will permit the manufacturer to contract with the retailer, even
though the retailer buys from the jobber would simplify operation under
the Act. There seems no necessity that "Fair Trade" contracts be in
connection with actual sales, since the consideration in contracts between
manufacturers and retailers, having no direct contact, sales being made
through jobbers, would seem to be substantially the same as in the case
of subscriptions for business purposes.'2 If Section 2 of the Act is finally
declared constitutional sub-sections (a) and (b) of the first section should
be clarified by amendment.
Section 2 embodies the text of the amendment to the California statute
quoted above. It provides in effect that whenever such contracts are in
12. 1 WnSTON, CONTRACrS (1920) § 117.
19361
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existence in connection with any given trade-marked article, those who
"wilfully and knowingly" fail to conform to the minimum price estab-
lished under such contracts, are guilty of unfair competition and are
liable at the suit of any person who may be damaged thereby, whether
or not they are themselves parties to such contracts.
Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:
"This act shall not apply to any contract or agreement between producers or
between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or resale prices."
This section was intended to prevent price fixing agreements between
particular classes. No two producers are permitted to enter into Fair
Trade contracts and the same is true of any two or more wholesalers or
retailers. The Act applies to "vertical" contracts only, not to "hori-
zontal" contracts.
The Act in principle conflicts with the Federal Anti-Trust Acts.Y'
The state Act permits price maintenance, the federal Acts forbid it. In
enforcing the respective statutes, however, there is no conflict-at least
in theory. The federal statutes are restricted to sales in interstate com-
merce or to sales directly affecting interstate commerce. The Fair
Trade Act contemplates sales in intrastate commerce only. In practice,
there may be considerable difficulty in avoiding what would seem to be
a clash between the state and federal statutes. In the event of a clash
the state statute must give way. A state cannot stand in the way of
the enforcement of federal laws.14
The violation of the federal Anti-Trust Acts subjects the violator to a
suit for triple damages by anyone injured,"0 to criminal prosecution under
the direction of the United States Attorney General's office,16 and to
a suit by the Federal Trade Commission.Y7 Under such circum-
stances, manufacturers will wish to avoid any plan involving sales directly
affecting interstate commerce. The construction of the phrase "directly
affecting interstate commerce" becomes of paramount importance.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly defined interstate commerce and
acts affecting interstate commerce. The Schechter Case8 is the Court's
last word. In that case defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari
in a criminal action to review the judgment below in so far as it affirmed
convictions for violations of the live poultry code.
13. SHER1" ANxTI-TRuST AcT, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1926);
CLAYTON ANTI-TRuST ACT, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 12 (1926); FEDEmRu.TnRvE
Co nnssiozi ACT, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 41-51 (1926).
14. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 333 (1904).
15. SHniE, s ANTI-TRIuST AcT, 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 7 (1926).
16. SHmr iA ANTx-TRUST AcT, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1926),
17. FEDERAL TRADE Co MIssixo AcT, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1927).
18. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 544 (1935);
Federal Trade Comm. v. Pacific Paper Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52 (1927).
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As to interstate commerce, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes speaking for
the Court, said:
"Did the defendants' transactions directly 'affect' interstate commerce so
as to be subject to federal regulation? The power of Congress extends not
only to the regulation of transactions which are part of interstate commerce,
but to the protection of that commerce from injury. It matters not that the
injury may be due to the conduct of those engaged in intrastate operations.
Thus, Congress may protect the safety of those employed in interstate trans-
portation 'no matter what may be the source of the dangers which threaten it?
Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 27. We said in Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 51, that it is the 'effect upon interstate
commerce,' not 'the source of the injury,' which is 'the criterion of congressional
power.' We have held that, in dealing with common carriers engaged in both
interstate and intrastate commerce, the dominant authority of Congress neces-
sarily embraces the right to control their intrastate operations in all matters
having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control
is essential or appropriate to secure the freedom of that traffic from interference
or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the interstate service.
The Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 351, 352; Wisconsin Railroad Comm'n v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 588. And combinations and conspir-
acies to restrain interstate commerce, or to monopolize any part of it, are none
the less within the reach of the Anti-Trust Act because the conspirators seek
to attain their end by means of intrastate activities. Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 310; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone
Cutters Assn., 274 U. S. 37, 46.
"In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intra-
state transactions upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there
is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects.
The precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise, but the distinction
is clear in principle. Direct effects are illustrated by the railroad cases we have
cited, as e.g., the effect of failure to use prescribed safety appliances on railroads
which are the highways of both interstate and intrastate commerce, injury to
an employee engaged in interstate transportation by the negligence of an em-
ployee engaged in an intrastate movement, the fixing of rates for intrastate
transportation which unjustly discriminate against interstate commerce. But
where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely
indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power. If the
commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which
could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal
authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people and the
authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance
of the federal government.
"The distinction between direct and indirect effects has been dearly recog-
nized in the application of the Anti-Trust Act. Where a combination or con-
spiracy is formed, with the intent to restrain interstate commerce or to monopo-
lize any part of it, the violation of the statute is clear. Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 310. But where that intent is absent,
and the objectives are limited to intrastate activities, the fact that there may
1936]
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be an indirect effect upon interstate commerce does not subject the parties to
the federal statute, notwithstanding its broad provisions. .... "
In operating under the Fair Trade Act one obvious way to avoid con-
flict with the anti-trust laws presents itself, viz., to conduct the business
wholly within the state of New York. If the goods are manu-
factured within the state, are sold and distributed and contracts entered
into within the state, certainly no interstate commerce would be directly
or indirectly affected. On the other hand, if the goods are manufactured
outside the state of New York, any attempt to operate under the Fair
Trade Act becomes questionable. The manufacture and sale of the
goods within the state of New York in many cases becomes impossible.
Plans have been suggested which contemplate that the goods will be
manufactured without the state, such as the following:
1. The foreign corporation to become qualified to do business within
the state of New York, to ship its goods to itself, within the state of New
York, where the goods come to rest within its warehouse; thereafter the
goods to'be sold in intrastate commerce; the "Fair Trade" contracts to
be entered into in the state of New York between the manufacturer and
the retailers.
2. The foreign corporation to sell its goods without price restriction
to jobbers within the state of New York, delivery to be taken at the
factory outside the state of New York; the goods then to be placed in
the jobbers warehouses in the state of New York; and thereafter to be
sold to retailers in intrastate commerce; the "Fair Trade" contracts to
be entered into between the foreign manufacturer and the retailers.
In the first plan the contracts would seem not to affect interstate com-
merce because the foreign manufacturer, himself, .would bring the goods
within the state. Interstate commerce would be involved only in the
actual transportation of the goods. In the second plan the contracts
would not directly involve interstate commerce. The jobbers in bring-
ing the goods into the state of New York, would cause the goods to be
shipped in interstate commerce, it is true. Following the interstate trans-
action, however, the goods would come to rest within the state of New
York and subsequently would be sold in intrastate commerce. The "Fair
Trade" contract would be between the manufacturer and the retailer.
The retailer would purchase his goods not from the manufacturer with
whom he would be under contract but from the jobber over whom the
manufacturer would have no control.
In determining whether any particular plan for operating under the
"Fair Trade Act" directly affects interstate commerce, the federal courts,
following the Schechter decision, will carefully consider the motive and
intent of the manufacturer in entering into the contracts. The facts in
the Sclechter Case are readily distinguishable from the facts involved
[Vol. 5
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in either of the two plans here considered. The facts would be closer,
should the anti-trust suit be brought against a New York retailer who
had signed a "Fair Trade" contract. Then the retail sales would be
local, as in the Schechter Case, and the effect, if any, on interstate com-
merce would be remote. No motive could be ascribed to the local retailer
of avoiding the anti-trust acts. In an anti-trust suit against a foreign
manufacturer, however, we start with the obvious fact that the goods of
the foreign manufacturer must be transported over the state line to reach
final consumers within the state. Any attempt to fix the price to final con-
sumers in such a case, seemingly would affect interstate commerce. But
the proposed plans involve contracts concerned with intrastate retail
sales. The only restraint is in connection with the attempt to protect a
"distinguished trade-mark." Commodities of the same general class
under the terms of the Act must be in fair and open competition. Under
such circumstances the intent of the foreign manufacturer would seem
to be, not to restrain trade but to protect its good will.
The drastic regulation authorized by Section 2 of the Act at once
raises the question of constitutionality. Three New York cases have
been previously mentioned. 9 In California, the Fair Trade Act has
been declared unconstitutional in one case,2 0 and constitutional in three,21
and is now before the state Supreme Court on appeal. One of these cases
may be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The arguments favoring the constitutionality of the Act include the
following:
(1) The earlier Supreme Court decisions being based primarily on
the federal Anti-Trust statutes are inapplicable to contracts in intrastate
commerce.
(2) The Act is not an effort on the part of the state to fix the price of
commodities but it seeks rather to curb the admitted evil of unfair or
predatory price cutting in all lines of business.
(3) It is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. The police
power of the state is not a circumscribed prerogative but is elastic, and
in keeping with the growth of knowledge and belief in the popular mind
of the need of its application, capable of expansion to meet existing con-
ditions in modern life and thereby of keeping pace with the social, eco-
nomic, moral and intellectual evolution of the human race; the legislature
is primarily the judge of the economic necessity of such enactment;
every possible presumption is in favor of its validity; and though the
19. See notes 1, 2 and 3, supa.
20. Factor v. Kunsman, Cal. Super. CL, Oct. 18, 1933.
21. General Cigar Co. v. The Drug Market, Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 18, 1934; Weco
Products Co. v. Sunset Cut-Rate Drug Co., Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 24, 1934; Emerson Drug
Co. v. Weinstein, Cal. Super. Ct.
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court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may
not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power.
(4) The Act is not violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Federal Constitution relating to "due process." The Constitution
does not secure to any one liberty to conduct his business in such fashion
as to inflict injury upon the public at large or upon any substantial group
of people. Due process demands only that the law shall not be un-
reasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that the means selected shall have
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. The
law is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious since full notice is required
to be given by the manufacturer desiring to protect his exclusive right
to the good will represented by his trade-mark. No penalty can be im-
posed and no action will lie unless the acts complained of are wilfully and
knowingly contrived. The means selected have a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained (i.e., the protection of good
will), since the price-cut is per se a disparagement of the value of the
product, and injurious to its standing in the public mind. It implies that
the owner of the mark and also retailers who sell at normal prices are
seeking unreasonable and exorbitant profits. No one is deprived of the
right to own or deal in trade-marked merchandise. The law merely re-
quires an exercise of property rights in such a way as not to inflict hard-
ships upon those who are dependent for their livelihood upon a reasonable
margin of profit between the cost and selling price of the goods.
(5) A price-cutter is guilty of unfair competition because he is in-
ducing others to breach contracts approved by the state and is destroying
the manufacturer's good will. The ability of the manufacturer to offer
his product to the public at reasonable prices depends upon volume pro-
duction and distribution. For a retailer to destroy the benefits of this
system by cheapening the product in the public mind and impairing the
public confidence in its value is inequitable. It is within the province
of the legislature to declare such acts unfair competition.
Governor Lehman, in approving the Act, said:
"The maintenance of the resale price of commodities that are in open com-
petition is not novel. We have in our present economic life many instances
of it; for example, automobiles, gasoline, newspapers, magazines, electrical
products.
"It seems to me to be sound economy to devise a method whereby a manu-
facturer or producer may protect himself against undue slashing of the price
of his product, with the consequent destruction of the value of his trade-mark
and good-will and with unnecessary loss to others.
"Moreover, I believe this bill will protect the small independent merchant,
retailer ind businessman. It should offer some protection against devastating
cut-price practices, such as the ruthless method of loss-leader articles. The
bill will also serve to discourage falsification and adulteration of commodities.
(Vol. 5
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"The bill before me may not be perfect in its provisions. If enacted into law,
it will undoubtedly have to be clarified and modified by amendment as ve gather
experience in its application. In all probability it will not bring about all the
good results claimed by its proponents.
"After considerable study and consideration of this bill, I believe it to be
in the general public interest that it be placed on our statute books."
Those opposing the Act on the ground that it is unconstitutional argue:
(1) Section 2 of the Act permits a manufacturer to charge a dealer
with the breach of contracts made by others, to which he is not a party,
and to which he has refused to become a party. The right of the owner
to sell his property at a price satisfactory to himself is an inherent attri-
bute to the property itself and is within the due process clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.22
(2) A statute regulating or interfering with private business can be
upheld only under the police power of the state, upon the theory that it is
for the protection of the public safety, health or morals. It has consis-
tently been held by the courts that the power to fix prices does not exist
in respect of merely private property or business, but exists only where
the business or property involved has become affected with a public
interest.' The decisions of the Supreme Court upholding governmental
price regulation, aside from cases involving legislation to tide over tem-
porary emergencies, has turned upon the existence of conditions peculiar
to the business under consideration, which bore such a substantial and
definite relation to the public interest as to justify an indulgence in the
legal fiction of a grant by the owner to the public of an interest in the
use.2" A business is not affected with a public interest merely because it
is large or because the public is warranted in having a feeling of concern
in respect to its maintenance. Nor is the interest meant such as arises
from the mere fact that the public derives benefit, accommodation, ease
or enjoyment from the existence or operation of the business, and while
the word has not always been limited narrowly as strictly denoting a
"right", that synonyip more nearly than any other expresses the sense in
which it is understood.25
(3) Experience shows that the best interests of the public are served
by permitting a free play of competitive conditions. While the purpose
of the Act, i.e., to suppress predatory price-cutters, is laudatory, the terms
of the Act permit trade-mark owners to maintain any price they desire
for their products, no matter how high. Free competition is eliminated;
a monopoly is granted. The public is deprived of the benefit of lower
22. People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343 (1888).
23. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927) and cases cited.
24. Id. at 438.
25. Id. at 430.
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prices, which economical management usually brings. The statute is
not limited in terms to a suppression of unfair or predatory price-cutting.
It may be employed to prevent any price variation no matter whether
it may be justified or not. Consequently, the statute is not in the interest
of the public.
(4) The statute is discriminative. It does not provide that the manu-
facturer sell his product at the same price, even to the same class of
wholesale or retail customers. There is nothing in the statute which pre-
vents the manufacturer from selling his product at varying discounts or
even at less than cost; and at the same time he may sue for damages a
retailer who resells his product at less than the price fixed by contract
between the manufacturer and other dealers. An unscrupulous manu-
facturer, by such methods, may place a retailer at a serious disadvantage
in competition with other dealers.
In vetoing the Fair Trade Bill the Arizona Governor said:
"I believe that through the drastic regulations of this measure price fixing on
every commodity would be had. This would destroy competition and compe-
tition is the life of trade. I believe also that this bill would be very burden-
some on many citizens of Arizona who are struggling for a livelihooo."
A plaintiff in a suit under the Fair Trade Act normally would plead,
in addition to other necessary allegations, merely that the defendant's
act of price-cutting was unfair competition as defined by the Act. Very
likely no effort would be made to show that price-cutting was unfair
competition apart from the statute.
It may be that the framers of the Act in defining price-cutting as un-
fair competition intended to suggest evidence which should be included
in a case testing the constitutionality of the Act. Why is price-cutting
unfair competition? Every court will be interested in the answer to that
question. In presenting the most favorable case the answer should be
evident from the proofs. Testimony of the following facts might prove
helpful:
1. Facts showing that plaintiff's advertising and selling methods are
free from practices not consonant with the avowed purpose of the Act;
that plaintiff is possessed of a distinguished trade-mark, sells his product
at a reasonable price, and treats customers in a given class on an equal
basis.
2. Facts showing that the sale of the trade-marked article in question
at cut prices has injuriously affected the good will represented by the
trade-mark. Members of the public might be called who were formerly
regular purchasers of the trade-marked article at the standard price
but refused to buy the product at the cut price believing it to have been
cheapened by the manufacturer so that it could be sold at such a price.
3. Facts showing that the price-cutter was in effect making misrepre-
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sentations. For example, members of the public might be called who
believed that because of the price-cutter's low prices other retailers were
charging exorbitant prices and were, therefore, not reliable.
4. Facts showing that dealers under contract with the manufacturer
have been forced to breach their contracts by the acts of the defendant
price-cutter with defendant's knowledge.
Inducing a breach of contract has been held to be actionable, -21 Dis-
paragement of goods coupled with other unfair acts has been enjoined.- T
Contracts to maintain retail prices have been held to be legal irrespective
of the Fair Trade Statute.
In view of decisions such as these the question of whether or not the
Act is declaratory of the common law may be presented in one of the
cases testing the constitutionality of the Act.
The law of "unfair competition" is forever developing. In its inception
it was confined to acts which resulted in the passing off of the goods of
one for those of another. Infringement of trade-mark was the most
common form of unfair competition, although as early as 1843 Lord
Langdale considered a case involving the dress of goods. - "Unfair com-
petition" is a misnomer. No longer is the lack of competition between
the parties a defense to an action for "unfair competition."3su The law
now even includes the sale of plaintiff's goods as defendant's.3' Equity
looks not at the character of the business in which the parties before the
court are engaged, but at the honesty or dishonesty of their acts.32
In recent years Congress has developed a broader term. By the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act33 unfair viethods of competition are declared
unlawful, leaving to the courts the definition of that term.34
26. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Platt, 142 Fed. 606 (C. C. N. D. IlL 1906); Wells &
Richardson Co. v. Abraham, 146 Fed. 190 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1906); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. Jayne Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838 (C. C. D. Mass. 1906); Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass.
144, 72 N. E. 839 (1905); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930)
and cases cited.
27. Maytag v. Meadows, 35 F. (2d) 403 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
28. Marsich v. Eastman Kodak Co., 244 App. Div. 295, 279 N. Y. Supp. 140 (2d
Dep't 1935).
29. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84, 49 Eng. Reprints 994 (Ch. 1843). The common law of
trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition. Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 413 (1916).
30. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Peninsula
Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658, 661 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Ward Baking Co. v.
Potter-Wrightington, 298 Fed. 398 (C. C. A. lst, 1924); Vogue Co. v. Thompson Co.,
300 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924).
31. Associated Press v. International News Service, 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
32. Dodge Bros. v. East, 8 F. (2d) 872, 875 (E. D. N. Y. 1925) citing Nn-s, U:r'Am
CoIU=rnoN (1909).
33. 38 STAT. 717, 724 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 41, 51 (1926).
34. Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920).
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The Tariff Act provides that "unfair methods of competition and un-
fair acts of importation of articles into the United States, or in their sale
by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent or either, the effect or ten-
dency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently
and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the estab-
lishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and com-
merce in the United States, are declared unlawful." 5
The National Industrial Recovery Act provided for codes of fair com-
petition and the violation of any such code was made a misdemeanor. 0
More than twenty years ago Printers' Ink sponsored a model statute
making untrue and misleading advertising a misdemeanor. The statute
was adopted by many states, including New York. 7
Price cutting is now defined by the Fair Trade Act as unfair competi-
tion. Regardless of the final action on the Fair Trade Act, public con-
sciousness of the unfairness of predatory price-cutting may have been
sufficiently aroused that the courts will take cognizance of possible relief
under the common law.
35. (Italics supplied). 46 STAT. 703, 19 U. S. C. A. § 1337 (a) (1930).
36. 48 STAT. 196, 15 U. S. C. A. § 703 (1933). Declared unconstitutional in A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). For a reference to Unfair
Methods of Competition in the Codes see Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., Inc.,
8 F. Supp. 314, 323 (E. D. N. Y. 1934), mod., C. C. A. 2d, July 8, 1935.
37. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1915) § 421.
